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COMMENTARY-THE ADVOCATE'S DUTY

ARGUING THE LAW: THE ADVOCATE'S
DUTY AND OPPORTUNITY*
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.**
There have been many expositions on advocacy, including some
delivered as Sibley Lectures.' These expositions say pretty much
the same thing: be candid, be thorough, be concise, formulate the
issue carefully, answer questions directly, and "go for the jugular."
It would be incautious to reject good advice as to technique, and
this sort of thing sounds like good advice. Yet the fact that the
same advice keeps coming forth raises doubt about whether it is
being heeded, or even heard. It also raises the possibility that the
problem of advocacy is more complex than implied by these pedagogic admonitions. My purpose is to explore that possibility.
The present analysis concentrates on advocacy concerning legal
issues. It thus excludes the complex subject of advocacy of factual
issues, a subject that deserves full attention of its own. However, I
believe the following analysis also applies to the advocacy of fact
issues. At any rate, included within the topic are the advocacy of
"straight" legal questions, such as whether a line of precedent
should be slightly extended or slightly curtailed, and also the advocacy of "policy" questions, such as whether a particular question
ought to be resolved by the courts or relegated to the legislature.
Our topic also includes law and motion matters in the trial court as
well as appellate advocacy.
* The John A. Sibley Lecture in Law delivered at the University of Georgia School of
Law on February 11, 1982, revised and expanded for publication.
** Baker Professor of Law, Yale University. Reporter, American Bar Association Special
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. The view expressed are mine and are
not necessarily those of the Commission.
' See, e.g., Fuller, The Law's PrecariousHold On Life, 3 GA. L. Rnv. 530 (1969); Johnson,
The Attorney and the Supremacy of Law, 1 GA. L. REv. 38 (1966).
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The Parlous State of Advocacy

In the now more than twenty years that I have been teaching, a
great many of my former students have gone on to be clerks to
judges. They have served as such in most parts of the country, in
appellate courts and trial courts, federal courts and state courts,
activist courts and traditional courts. They have worked for famous judges and for obscure ones. They have had all kinds of experience in all kinds of cases. There is, however, one uniformity in
this variety. All the clerks have the impression that the briefs generally are not very good. Indeed, generally they are bad.
This testimony of legal novices might be discounted. However, I
had confidence in these witnesses when they were students, and
can see no reason to think their discernment deteriorated when
they went to work for judges. Moreover, the fact that law clerks
would hold this opinion so uniformly and so continuously suggests
that it reflects the opinions of the judges themselves. Conversations with judges confirm this inference.
Another source evidencing the inadequacy of trial and appellate
briefs is the burgeoning of court legal staffs.2 Every appellate judge
now has at least one law clerk, many have two, and some have
three. Many if not most appellate courts also have a legal staff
serving the court as a whole. To an increasing degree, trial court
judges also have law clerks, and some of them have law student
interns as well. Of course, some of this staff is committed to managing the flow of work-screening, classifying, sequencing, etc.and some of it is committed to handling technical detail, such as
checking citations and reading proofs. But a great deal of staff
time, according to all accounts, is spent in trying to discover the
legal issues involved. If contemporary advocacy were serving its
supposed function, this kind of staff work would be largely unnecessary, for the advocates' briefs would have revealed the legal
issues.
A third datum is the testimony of judges. We have it on the authority of Cardozo that as many as eighty percent of the cases
before an appellate court should not be there.3 That figure is often
2 For a statistical survey of the use of law clerks in the federal and state appellate courts,
see P. BARNETT, LAW CLERKS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND STATE APPELLATE COURTS

(1973).
3 See B. CARDozo, THE NATURE

OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

164 (1921). Cardozo observed:
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repeated by appellate judges. I venture that the figure for law and
motion matters in trial courts is higher. This is powerful evidence.
To say that a case should not even be before the court is usually
taken as impugning the bar's integrity; but it also impugns the
bar's technique. If an advocate cannot convince a court that he has
a serious position, let alone a convincing position, then the advocate has failed in his threshold task.
There is thus strong reason to believe that the state of present
advocacy is pretty bad, and that it has not been a lot better in the
past. Of course, there are reasons to be skeptical about professions
of dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. Burgeoning
court staffs may simply reflect the operation of a Parkinsonian law
that staffs expand no matter what. There is also reason to doubt
the opinion of the bench as regards the bar. Judging involves a lot
of drudgery, and lawyers are the ones who bring in the work; the
possibility is too strong to be ignored that the judges' complaints
represent a projection of hostility. In addition, we have the results
of the study done in connection with the Devitt Report. on the
whole, judges were not highly consistent in the evaluations of the
quality of advocates' performances, and the causes of these inconsistencies were unclear.' In short, judges' assessments have so
much variance as to be untrustworthy.
Yet there is still other testimony that cannot be discounted. This
is the experience of lawyers in the Office of the Solicitor General of
the United States. That office does more appellate litigation than
any other law office in the country, certainly so if routine criminal
cases are excluded. The cases in which the Solicitor General is involved are, on the average, very important; also important is the
stature of the courts before which that office practices-the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States courts of
appeals. By general recognition the office of the "S.G." practices at
a high level of professional competence, and with a large measure
of professional detachment. Respect is thus due the opinions of
"Of the cases that come before the court in which I sit, a majority, I think, could not, with
semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one." Id. In a later work he wrote: "Ninetenths, perhaps more, of the cases that come before a court are predetermined- . . .
-their fate preestablished by inevitable laws that follow them from birth to death." B.
CARnozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60 (1924).
4 See A. PARTRIDGE & G. BERmoNT, THE QuALITY OF ADVOCACY IN THE FEDERnAL COURT 23
(1978).
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lawyers in that office concerning the quality of advocacy against
the Government. A commonly shared opinion, gleaned from informal conversations with former S.G. staff, is that the quality of advocacy is enormous in variability and poor on the average.
A level of technical performance that is poor on the average is a
very serious condition. If the average were high, one might be optimistic about the prospects for reform. The aim would be to get rid
of the proverbial "few bad apples" that contaminate an otherwise
solid barrel. But if we suppose that poor performance is endemic
rather than occasional, the problem of reform is vastly more complicated, if not impossible. The difficulties are both political and
substantive. The political problem is that the bar in general is
likely to resist any reform whose effects would require substantial
modification of average practice standards. It would be a mistake,
however, to attach too much weight to this political impediment to
reform. The problem is much tougher than that. Standards of
practice are the result of long-persisting and deeply rooted tendencies. The current generation of practitioners at any given time constitutes the human inventory presently available for work and thus
limits the possibilities for change in the foreseeable future. It is an
extraordinarily difficult task to raise the average of a skill performed by a group of independent adults. As folk wisdom says, it is
hard to teach old dogs new tricks, even harder where the old dogs
run the school and do the teaching.
I say this not by way of recrimination but by way of realism. If
we are seriously concerned with the level of practice in the profession-here specifically legal advocacy-we should recognize that
the general average cannot be changed very quickly, that it will not
change very much through voluntary effort, and that trying to
change it chiefly through entry-level education is a Sisyphean undertaking. This is not to say that efforts in this direction are not
morally commendable, or even that they may not be in some sense
worthwhile. It is merely to say that they do not constitute a serious
program of change.
A more serious program for improving the quality of advocacy
would require achievement of a specified minimum of competence
as a prerequisite to regular practice as an advocate. I have already
suggested important reasons for doubting the political feasibility of
such a regulation. Even if a system of qualifications were adopted,
for reasons already suggested, I believe that the minimum stan-
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dard actually employed would remain minimal. A highly formal
definition would simply be given an operative definition that would
actually entail little change.'
I would not necessarily make this pessimistic prediction about
all situations in American life, or even about all situations in the
American practice of law. I am led to the forecast, however, by reflection on some feedback received in connection with the proposed revision of the rules of ethics of the American legal
profession.
B.

The Advocate's Duty

As is generally known, there presently exists a Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated by the American Bar Association.6 This Code has been adopted, sometimes with amendments,
in a large majority of the states." As is not quite so generally
known, there is a proposal that the Code be superseded by a reformulated codification called the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.' The Model Rules are the product of the ABA Special Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, generally known
as the Kutak Commission. The proposed Model Rules have been
presented to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association and at this writing are under debate. The coverage of the proposed rules is comprehensive, and some of the recommendations
are controversial. My purpose in referring to the Model Rules is
not to address them generally, let alone to address questions of
professional ethics at large. Rather, it is to focus on a regulation
relevant to the issue of advocacy.
In developing the proposed Model Rules of Professional Con-

5 In making this statement, I am not referring to the possibility that lawyers would consciously resist compliance with applicable regulations. Of course, there would be legal friction in obtaining compliance, as there always is with new regulations. There would be claims

that higher standards violate due process and equal protection; no doubt there would also
be unblushing objection that higher standards would infringe the right of clients to assistance of counsel My forecast reaches beyond this. The forecast is simply that, whatever the
rule might be, practice would continue to be about the same, because lawyers in general

would not change their standard of practice.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBITrY (1980).
For an analysis of the differences between the ABA Model Code and the version
adopted by each state, see M. PROCTOR & . ALEXANDER-SMITH, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1980).
a MODEL RUL.S OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft May 30, 1981).
£
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duct, a Discussion Draft, dated January 30, 1980, was circulated to
the bar. In this Discussion Draft was a provision governing candor
to the court in arguing issues of law. The proposal, which was Rule
3.1(c) of the Discussion Draft, was as follows: "If a lawyer discovers
that the tribunal has not been apprised ,of legal authority known to
the lawyer that would probably have a substantial effect on the
determination of a material issue, the lawyer shall advise the tribunal of that authority."'
This provision attracted vociferous, indeed splenetic, criticism.
First, it was argued that the proposal was a new and therefore dangerous burden on the advocate. Second, it was argued that such a
requirement is inconsistent with the advocate's role in the adversary system.1°
When the Kutak Commission assessed these criticisms it decided that although the proposal might represent improvement
over'present law, any improvement was not worth the political cost
resulting from the controversy engendered by it. Accordingly, we
simply retained the formula on the subject that is found in the
present Code. DR 7-106(B)(1) of the present Code requires that
"[iun presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose...
legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to be
directly adverse to the position of his client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel."' 1
9

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1(c) (Discussion Draft Jan. 30, 1980).

See, e.g., Elliot, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Invention Not
Mothered by Necessity?, 54 CONN. B.J. 265 (1980); Koskoff, Proposed New Code of Professional Responsibility: 1984 Is Now!, 54 CONN. B.J. 260 (1980).
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B)(1) (1980). This provision is
carried forward in Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the proposed Model Rules with some unimportant alterations of syntax. In its key terms the proposed model rule is taken verbatim from present
DR 7-106(B)(1). These terms are: that the legal material be known to the lawyer; that the
lawyer be aware it has not been disclosed to the court by opposing counsel; and that the
material be "authority in the controlling jurisdiction ... directly adverse to the position of
his client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (Proposed Final Draft
May 30, 1981).
There is no legislative history of the meaning of the term "controlling jurisdiction." The
term obviously includes authority emanating from the tribunals of the legal sovereign in
which the proceeding is pending. I assume it also includes federal authority when a federal
question arises in a state court. It may also include foreign authority in some circumstances;
there is an interesting choice of law problem submerged in the term.
It may also be noted that the present Code and the proposed Model Rules, read carefully,
require citation of "directly adverse" authority even if it emanates from a tribunal of coordinate or inferior jurisdiction. Thus, if a lawyer knew that an intermediate appellate court had
10
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There is some difference between this language and that in the
Discussion Draft that had generated so much controversy. The difference is between authority "that would probably have a substantial effect on the determination of a material issue" and authority
"in the controlling jurisdiction... directly adverse." The Discussion Draft would have required disclosure of the following authorities that are not covered in the Code: (1) authority from the controlling jurisdiction that would "probably have a substantial
effect" even though it is not "directly adverse" and (2) authority
from a sister jurisdiction that would "probably have a substantial
effect." I am sorry that the scope of the advocate's duty is left unchanged in the final draft of the Model Rules, but no more so than
I am about other proposals that have been left on the drafting
room floor. The important fact is that only a small difference was
involved.
An even more important fact, however, is the perception and interpretation of the proposal in the Discussion Draft. Evidently
many lawyers believed that the Discussion Draft proposed a novel
requirement-that an advocate cite adverse authority. Implicit in
the criticism is ignorance that DR 7-106(B)(1) contains that obligation. Equally revealing was the criticism that such an obligation
is incompatible with the role of advocate. 12 Apparently, many lawyers think that an advocate should cite only favorable authority.13
If this concept of advocacy as to matters of law is widely shared,
most lawyers cite adverse authority only when there is no practical
ruled on the point in question, that ruling would have to be cited not only to a trial court
but also to a coordinate branch of the intermediate appellate court and to the supreme
court. This is because the term "controlling" modifies the term "jurisdiction" and not the
term "legal authority." Indeed, technically an advocate before a supreme court is required
to cite any trial court decision he knew to be adverse, but is not required to cite a case on
point decided by the highest court of a sister jurisdiction even if he knows that the opinions
of the sister jurisdiction enjoy high local repute. This seems anomalous if not bizarre. It was
this anomaly that inspired the revision proposed in the Discussion Draft.
12 See Koskoff, supra note 10.
" More specifically, the criticism impliedly asserts that it is inappropriate for an advocate
to cite "legal authority.. . that would probably have a substantial effect on the determination of a material issue" if that authority is adverse. In this interpretation of the role of
advocate, the lawyer would have researched for relevant authorities simply as a matter of
competence and self-protection. Thus, he would know about the adverse authority. Presumably the lawyer would be ready to deal with these authorities in a responsive brief or in
answering questions from the bench. But he should not advise the court of their existence,
let alone address their merits.
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way to avoid doing so. Such practical necessity exists where the
precedent in question issued from the very court before which the
advocate appears and the decision is within memory of the bench.
In other situations, however, the lawyer does not bother with adverse authority. No doubt this thought is: Who knows, maybe the
judges and law clerks will not find the case? Thus, in the trial
courts all the time, and in the intermediate appellate courts most
of the time, and even in the Supreme Court, each side cites authorities going its way and leaves it to the court to figure out which line
to follow.
If that is the prevalent view of the role of the advocate in matters of law, we can understand the distress resulting when the Discussion Draft reminded the bar that the law presently is otherwise.
We can also conjecture that lawyers' compliance with the law in
this regard will not be much better under the Model Rules than it
has been under the Code. The legal duty may be clear enough, but
most lawyers are oblivious to it and will act accordingly.
It is perhaps worth pondering what these lawyers think they are
doing in writing a brief that ignores relevant adverse authority.
The behavior probably reflects a calculation of risks. First, the risk
of violating the rule is low. The rule requiring citation of opposing
authority is only rarely operative, because the other side usually
cites directly supportive authority and, if it does not, the judges
often remember. Against this is the possibility that neither the
other side nor the court will retrieve the relevant precedent, and so
the case will be decided without reference to it. Second, even if a
lawyer is caught in a violation, the court will not make much of it,
partly because the rule is at variance with prevailing practice.
Third, having to cite adverse authority means having to think why
and how that authority can be distinguished or otherwise neutralized. Thinking in this depth takes time, and therefore money, and
in any event is the responsibility of the court.
If lawyers are disinclined to cite opposing authority, they must
be even more disinclined to give such authority serious and respectful attention. Given that attitude, it is understandable why
the briefs are generally so bad. The weight of an argumentative
position can be properly gauged only by reference to what can be
set against it. Briefs that expound only favorable authorities deal
therefore merely with the surface of the controversy. Going below
the surface, however, requires direct recognition that the case is
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chancy. This in turn may explain the bar's anxiety about the citation rule: lawyers find that frankly assessing the strength of their
own position is a fearful experience. 4 If the underlying resistance
to the citation rule is fear, and if fear of dealing with opposing
authority is expressive of a larger fear of weakness in the contest as
a whole, then there is not much prospect in trying to improve advocacy through rules. Hence, it is probably right that the advocate's duty in arguing law should not be made more rigorous than
it now is. If it is difficult to legislate morality, it is even more difficult to legislate bravery.
We therefore should reconcile ourselves to the fact that we cannot induce better advocacy through more rigorous rules. What can
be done to improve advocacy? Perhaps very little. But perhaps
something can be done if we shift focus from the advocate's duty
to the advocate's opportunity. Anxiety may be overcome, if not
dissipated, by the prospect that the chances of victory can be improved by frank dealing with the law, adverse as well as favorable.
C.

The Advocate's Opportunity

This proposition might be approached by examining the relationship between the advocate's function and the function of the
court in deciding issues of law.
The advocate's function in arguing to a tribunal is derivative
from the court's function. That is, the advocate's purpose is to induce certain behavior on the part of the court, specifically that of
deciding the case in favor of the advocate's client.1 But the court's
task is not simply to decide the case in the advocate's favor. If that
were all, a court would decide a case appropriately if it simply said
"reversed" or "affirmed" (or, at the trial level, "granted" or "denied"). I realize that many per curiam opinions these days say little more than this. But even these days most opinions are not per
curiam, and even the per curiams recite some authority, and occasionally even advance some reasoning, in support of their conclusions. In any event, if two conditions are met, there is more to the
court's task than finding some kind of authority in support of its
4 It occurs to me that similar fear attends a lawyer's preparation for trial and explains

why poor trial preparation remains a persistent failing even though every discussion of trial
advocacy emphasizes the importance of preparation.
25

See

. LxLwxuLY,

THE CoMMoN LAW TnDITION: DEcwING APPE.ALs 236-55 (19 0).
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position.
The first of these conditions is that the legal question involved is
genuinely arguable. If the legal question is not genuinely arguable,
the case should not be there at all. If there is nothing to be said on
the advocate's own side, he should not be in court; if there is nothing to be said on the opposite side, the advocate should have
moved for summary disposition.
The second condition is that the court is prepared to fulfill its
responsibility in dealing with an arguable question of law.1° The
court's responsibility is not merely to decide the issue; as noted, it
can do that simply by saying "reversed" or "affirmed." To reach a
conclusion rationally requires something more. It requires that the
court acknowledge, at least implicitly, what the argument is. That
is, the court must acknowledge that the authorities are in conflict
or that there is an unresolved question of legal policy at issue. In
other words, to make a rational choice among legal alternatives
presupposes a recognition that there are alternatives. The rhetoric
of judicial opinions of course often tries to make it appear that a
legal conclusion is foreordained. But this is not true except in cases
that should have been summarily dismissed in the first place.
If it is the court's task to acknowledge the competing considerations at issue, and if it is the advocate's task to anticipate the
court's task and to help in its performance, then the advocate has
to acknowledge and address the competing considerations. If there
is conflict in the authorities, he has to recognize the conflict and
suggest how it might be resolved in such a way that his client
prevails. This is also true if there is conflict in the applicable legal
policies on a matter not previously dealt with by the authorities.
Moreover, the advocate should suggest a means of resolving the
conflict that maximizes the chance of prevailing for his client.
The chance of prevailing is greatest if the decision point involves
the greatest concession with respect to the client's position that is
consistent with victory for the client. That is, where the question is
seriously debatable, the strongest position for the client is one that
borders on concession to the opposing party. Any more extravagant
position on behalf of the client may seem stronger because it is less
equivocal. However, it is actually weaker because it asks the court
16For an analysis of the reasoning process employed by courts in deciding close cases, see
id.; B. CARDOZO, supra note 3, at 142-80.
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to reject the competing value in greater degree than is minimally
necessary to decide the case in the client's favor."
A logically equivalent formulation of the foregoing proposition is
that an argument should acknowledge the weaknesses of one's
case. This formulation has been put succinctly by Judge (and former Professor) Benjamin Kaplan as follows: "A brief or argument
impresses [the court] in the degree that it is willing actually to face
rather than mask or evade the weaknesses of that side of the
case-a point that should be inscribed on the walls of some major
law offices." 1
However, I believe thus formulating the point in terms of the
weakness of the case is generally misinterpreted by lawyers. I believe they interpret it to mean that acknowledging the weaknesses
of a position is a weakening of one's position. Hence, the proposition is ignored as being goody-goody advice from judges to lawyers.
But "weaknesses" in one's own case exist because there are
strengths in the other side's case. The advocate's task is to discern
what these strengths are. Specifically, what the advocate should
isolate are the strengths in the other side that can be conceded
while adhering to a prevailing position; that is, concessions that
reduce the boundaries of a position make the position stronger.
Perhaps many lawyers do not realize that the strongest position
strategically is the one that is positionally most moderate. In other
words, they think that a trenchant, uncompromising line of argument is somehow overpowering because of its tendentiousness. In
this supposition they may be bringing into adjudication a form of
argument that is more suitable to negotiation. Under some circumstances tendentious argument may make sense in negotiation because that kind of argument conceals openings for concessions.
Tendentious argument may also make sense if one assumes that
judges can be intimidated by verbal assault. This form of argument, however, makes no sense if it is assumed that verbal assault
generally does not intimidate judges, but merely turns them off,
and if it is recognized that a judge, unlike an opposing party in

17

This point is a counterpart of the familiar proposition that a court, in deciding a ques-

tion of law, generally rests on the narrowest available ground. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
18 Kaplan, Book Review, 95 HARv. L. Rv.528, 531 (1981) (reviewing F. CoMN, TH
WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLEcTiONS FRoM THE APPrATE BENCH (1980)).
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negotiation, does not have to seek concessions but can impose
them.
Many lawyers apparently fail to comprehend this strategic logic.
Perhaps, as suggested earlier, it is because they are blinded by the
fear of candidly examining the legal uncertainty of their position.
Perhaps their briefs are exercises in assuaging self-doubt. Perhaps
the brief is addressed to the client and tries to give reassurance
and to demonstrate loyalty by means of belligerence. At any rate,
many lawyers seem to approach the court with this position in
mind: "I have a legal problem that the court will have to solve."
The strategically sounder proposition for the advocate to have in
mind is, "The court has a legal problem that I have to solve." That
problem is how the court can decide the case in favor of the advocate's client with the least encroachment on the authorities and
values that militate in the opposite direction.

